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OVER THE BACK FENCE: TAX SHELTERS AND OTHER
SALES OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX REDUCTIONS
by
THOMAS

S

A.

ROBINSON*

INTRODUCTION

the federal income tax system frequently make
the same tax reduction' more valuable to one taxpayer than to another.2
There are many types of such tax reductions (including deductions and
credits), creating a fertile environment for the tax shelter markets. Black letter
law says tax reductions are nontransferable. In other words, taxpayers are not
allowed to sell their mortgage interest deductions over the back fence to their
neighbors. Yet, observation reveals some transactions where tax reductions
are in effect bought and sold.3 This article will examine four of these transactions: business sales, divorce agreements, sale-leasebacks, and partnership
TRUCTURAL FEATURES OF

*B.S., Idaho, 1966; B.Litt., Oxford University, 1975; J.D., U.C.L.A., 1969; Professor of Law, University of
Miami; admitted to practice in California and Florida.
11have used the term "tax reduction" because it does not have the connotations associated with "tax
benefit" and is a broader term than "tax deduction." The term "tax reduction" can have either a narrow or
broad meaning. Unless otherwise indicated, I am using the term in its narrow sense. Narrowly, a tax reduction is a tax-significant condition, either status or event, which when reported on a tax return for a particular
year does reduce the taxes of the person reporting it in the year of its transfer. In addition, a tax reduction
may reduce taxes in other years, either past or future. The cases implicitly draw this distinction, sanctioning
tax reduction sales which may possibly reduce taxes in future years rather than those which surely reduce
current taxes. Compare Frank Lyon Co. V. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 580 n. 15 (1978) (sale leaseback
held proper by the Supreme Court, noting that the favorable tax consequences were not certain) with
Kresser v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 1621 (1970) (last minute shuffling of partnership income which was certain to
produce favorable tax consequences in the year of transfer held invalid).
2
For illustration of a conceivable sale of a tax reduction, assume unrelated taxpayers were able to file joint
returns, and a Mr. Rich and Mr. Poor were matched through a national exchange. Assume Mr. Rich's
$50,000 of income and Mr. Poor's zero income could be reported, for tax purposes only, as $25,000 of income each.. After Mr. Rich pays the "joint return's" taxes, there would be about $5,000 of tax savings, due
to the income tax's progressive rates, which the two could split between them, computed as follows. Federal
income taxes before credits on zero taxable income is zero, on $25,000 of taxable income is about $5,000,
and on $50,000 of taxable income is about $15,000. I.R.C. § 1(c)-(3) (1984). Before the tax benefit sale, Mr.
Rich owes about $15,000 of pre-credit tax, and Mr. Poor owes nothing. After the sale, by filing jointly, in effect Mr. Rich and Mr. Poor both owe $5,000, effectively reporting $25,000 each, for a total of roughly
$10,000. I.R.C. § l(a)(3) (1986). The sale produces a tax savings of $5,000. Mr. Rich of course pays the joint
taxes. The possibility of extra income to Mr. Poor by being relieved of this obligation is ignored. If this type
of sale were allowed, Mr. Poor would have in effect sold (or rented) his low-bracket rates to Mr. Rich. This
sale is different from a gratuitous assignment of income within families, where the transferor is a net loser.
Mr. Rich is not giving Mr. Poor anything. They may not even know each other. The sale occurs because the
tax reductions are more valuable to Mr. Rich than Mr. Poor. After the sale both parties are better off, at the
expense of the Treasury which in effect contributes the extra value. Of course, unrelated taxpayers are not
able to file joint returns, but see the delicious tongue-in-cheek anticipation of "Budget Rent-a-Spouse." Blum
& Pedrick, Taxation for Prosperity? Some AILJ Views on ERTA '81, 60 TAXES 92, 95-96 (1982).
The stakes, that is the potential revenue loss from tax benefit sales, is large in absolute if not relative
terms. The safe-harbor leasing provisions specifically authorized by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 cost approximately $3 billion in 1981-82 taxes.
3
See, e.g., 95-4th TAX. MAGMT. (BNA) A-I (1986) ("The law allows the spouses vast choice in allocating the
tax burdens between them.") (discussing the pre- 1985 law) and Weidner, Partnership Allocations & Tax Reform, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1,64 (1977) ("lit is extremely common for partners to attempt to allocate tax
benefits and burdens differently than they allocate cash benefits and burdens ....Depreciation deductions
and the tax losses they produce are viewed as commodities to be bartered among partners .... ")
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special allocations.'
Close observation of these four transactions yields intriguing connections.
For example, just as the sources of yellow fever can be traced to swamps, sales
of tax reductions, including tax shelters, can be traced to ambiguous sections
of the Internal Revenue Code. How quickly these areas receive attention is the
subject of another discovery. There appears to be a significant difference between the perceived and the actual federal income tax system. The forces of
reform seem to be stirred into action primarily by threats to the perceived, not
the actual, tax system.
The central problems of the first pair of transactional areas, business sales
and divorce agreements, are quite different from the second pair, saleleasebacks and partnership special allocations. The distinction is that in the
first pair, the tax reductions can be marketed only to the other person in the
transaction. But in the second, multiple parties may receive the reductions.'
The first pair of
ministrative problems
next segment of this
pattern's "substance"

transactions is best suited for a discussion of the adwhich breed sales of tax reductions. Accordingly, the
article, will examine the first pair. Normally a factdetermines its tax classification. However, where the

classifications are ill-drawn and ambiguous, another method of classification
must be used. The one most frequently employed is "parties' choice,"' which
allows the parties to choose those classifications which result in the least aggregate tax.
The second pair of transactions raises issues concerning tax shelters. Tax
shelters appear to be objectionable not because they threaten the actual federal
income tax system,7 but because they threaten the perceived federal income
tax system.' It is the marketing of tax shelters which appears to be the real
'Other transactions involving the transfer of tax reductions will not be examined, for example, I.R.C. §
38 1(a), (c)(l) involving carryovers of net operating losses. See also Tax Reform Act of 1984 (Division A of
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984) Pub. L. No. 98-369, 31, 98 Stat. 494 (1984) (curbing tax-exempt leasing
abuses).
'While no national exchange market expressly matches tax reduction buyers and sellers, the parties which
would be attracted to such a market are readily identifiable. Tax reduction "sellers" would generally be low
or zero-bracket taxpayers including; tax-exempt organizations, qualified pension trusts, municipalities, taxpayers with large depreciation deductions or loss carryovers, and, all too frequently, divorced women. Any
taxpayer in a bracket lower than the top marginal bracket is a potential tax-reduction seller. See Brown v.
Comm'r, 37 T.C. 461 (1961) (corporate bail-out allowed through "sale" to a tax-exempt organization). Tax
reduction "buyers" obviously would generally be high-bracket taxpayers.
'This is my term.
'The relative tax brackets of the parties and potential loss in government revenues are rarely considered in
tax reduction cases. More typical is the judicial hostility expressed in a leasing arrangement.
We do not criticize the commissioner. It is his duty to collect the revenue and it is a tough one. If he
resolves all questions in favor of the taxpayers, we soon would have little revenue. However, we do
suggest that after he has made allowances for depreciation, which he concedes, and an allowance for
interest, the attack on many of the "leases" may not be worthwhile in terms of revenue.
Estate of Starr v. Comm'r, 274 F.2d 294, 296-97 (9th Cir. 1959) (proported "lease" held actually a "sale" for
tax purposes).
'Some rough computations might put the potential for these transactions in perspective. The total
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harm. This article explores various solutions to this problem. 9
1.THE

A.

ADMINISTRATIVE

PROBLEM AND THE "PARTIES'
TAX CLASSIFICATION

CHOICE" METHOD OF

Methods of Analysis

By what means do we validly criticize the federal income tax system? One
method is to determine what is happening and then compare it with what we
believe should be happening. This comparison takes place on two levels: (1)
with what is happening as taxpayers attempt to avoid taxes and (2)with what
is happening in those judicial resolutions of the resulting disputes with the
Treasury." Prior to examining the first pair of transactions below, it will prove
useful to briefly sketch out an underlying theory of what appears to be happening in tax classification generally.
Without too much distortion, the present structure of the federal income
tax can be seen as a computational system. Perceived facts, or more pedantically, "fact patterns," from the real world are translated into defined terms" and
thereby imputed into the tax system. 2 Internal logic operators then compute
the tax due, usually to an exact dollar amount. Sometimes, as with the four
transactions examined here, the classification system does not work well. The
same fact pattern can be classified into either of two competing definitions,
leading to different tax results for the parties engaged in the transaction. When
this happens, tribunals can not decide classification disputes by using the fact
pattern's "substance" and must turn to some other classification method to
resolve the dispute before it. As mentioned, the most common alternate is
depreciable, depletable, and amortizable assets in place and newly acquired in 1980 was about $2 trillion.
Apart from the investment tax credit, the deductions for depreciation, depletion and amortization were
about $200 billion in 1980.
The potential market of individuals for these reductions is less than the amount of reductions that exist.
I.R.C. § I(a)(3) (1986) provides that persons with taxable incomes of more than approximately $100,000 pay
about 50% in federal income tax for every dollar earned. The aggregate taxable income of taxpayers in this
bracket is about $100 billion dollars. (These are the figures for individual income and do not include corporate income, but should provide some rough figures of the size of the potential demand for tax reductions.)
A paper allocation of about half of the 1980 annual depreciation to high-bracket individuals (without other
tax sections) would completely eliminate federal income tax for those high-bracket individuals. The loss in
the Treasury's revenue would be minimal, about 5% of the 1980 budget. Without public disclosure, the effects on the actual tax structure would also be minimal. Nevertheless, the general knowledge that anyone
earning over $100,000 a year can escape tax entirely would be a serious blow to the taxpayers' perception of
the tax system's fairness, undermining the essential element of efficient self-assessment.
9
Approximately 15% of the tax reductions sold in the congressionally sanctioned, safe-harbor sale-leasebacks went to lawyers, accountants and brokerage firms, about the same order of magnitude as promoter
fees in the partnership special allocation area. Unlike real estate tax shelters, sale-leasebacks did not have
time to reach all individuals. Elimination of controls on sales of tax reductions (including, but not limited to
sale-leasebacks) would create about a $750 million tax shelter industry.
0
" For convenience, the term "Treasury" will generally be used herein to refer to any of that department's
many branches and administrative titles, since precision will often detract from the flow of the text.
"Secretary" will refer to the Secretary of the Treasury, "Commissioner" will refer to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and "Service" will refer to the Internal Revenue Service, a branch of the Treasury.
"Such as "gross income," "interest," "gift," etc.
"Perception already classifies to some degree. The Russian words goluboy (light blue) and siniy (dark blue)
break up the "blue" part of the light spectrum in different ways than English, presumably coloring the ways
in which a Russian perceives his world.
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"parties' choice," where the parties agree on the classification. If the parties'
situations are such that one of the two competing classifications will lower the
taxes of one party more than it will raise the taxes of another party, the stage is
set for a possible sale of a tax reduction.
Take the example of a soon-to-be-divorced high earning husband and his
nonworking wife. There is usually some flexibility in whether these two parties
classify future cash payments from him to her as "alimony" or "child support."
As will be seen in more detail later, by choosing "alimony" as the classification
of the payments, the parties in effect allow dollars earned by the husband to be
taxed more lightly by employing the wife's under-used lower tax brackets. If
she is alert, she will exact a price for the use of her lower tax brackets. In
theory, the price should involve more dollars than she would have received
without her agreement to the classification choice, but the additional amount
should be less than the tax savings realized by her husband. The tax savings to
both parties can be substantial. It should be obvious that if the classification of
the fact pattern were clear, the tribunal would not need the "parties' choice"
method of classification and would deprive the parties of the opportunity to
make a tax reduction sale.
Once we find out what is happening, both in the tax avoidance transactions which lead to tax disputes and in the judicial resolution of those disputes,
we need to evaluate whether what is happening squares with what should be
happening. From what perspective do we evaluate the tax system? What
norms do we employ?
One normative approach already mentioned is to criticize the actual
system by comparison with an ideal one. For example, since there appears to
be no good reason why transfers of property at death should be treated differently than transfers of property by gift, an ideal federal income system
would treat them both alike. 3 There are almost as many idealized models as
there are observers, and this approach suggests many avenues of tax reform.
A second approach is political. No ideal model can adequately capture all
of the lives and all of the transactions affected by the tax system," which, after
all, is both the creation of our political process and is ultimately judged by it. 5
Unfortunately, the political process is better at reacting to suggested change
than initiating it. There may" be no political pressure to make a change which
could improve the tax system, or there may be political pressure to change a
' 3I.R.C. §§ 1014 and 1015 (1986) (carry over basis for transfers by gift, "step up" in basis for transfers by
death).
'it has been said that much of the economics underlying the tax system is difficult, even impossible. to
discover. B. BIrrKER. FEDERAL TAXAFION OF INCOME, EsTATES & (IF'I'S
198 1).
"SThe federal income tax system is the result of social preferences revealed and effectuated through a
political system which encompasses the tax system. L. EISENSTEIN, THF ltDOL.(XI1ES OF TAXATION (1961)
Social preferences at a particular time may be directly accessible. See Harstad, Interpreting Americans Attitudes Toward Taxes, TAX NorEs, Nov. 9, 1981 at 1083 (opinion polls indicating social preferences).
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system that cannot be improved.
These two normative approaches can be synthesized, drawing the best
from each, by using an experimental approach: try it and see if it works. Ideal
models can suggest avenues for reform which can be evaluated politically.
When Code Section 1023 was enacted in 197616 to bring the tax treatment of
gratuitous property transfers at death into line with those during life, the
change suggested by the ideal tax model did not work. After delaying the
change's implementation for three years, Section 1023 was repealed. 7
Since these are basically governmental processes, the interest of the organization may play an important, even dominating, role. Indeed, when one attempts to filter out the interests of the two main tribunals, the courts and the
Treasury, there may not be much left from which to draw normative conclusions.
B. Self-Limiting Sales of Tax Reductions: Business Sales &
Divorce Agreements
Turning to the cases, the opportunity for a sale of a tax reduction arises
when the events in a transaction can, with validity, be channeled into more
than one classification with different tax results to the parties. This section
looks at two such transactions which serve to illustrate the genre: business
sales and divorce agreements. In addition to having ambiguous classifications
in common, these two also share another characteristic which distinguishes
them from the second pair previously discussed. These two are self-limiting;
that is, the players are limited by the nature of the transaction. 8
The major arbitrators in these two transactions are the courts and the
Treasury. The differing standards they have adopted lead to considerable but
characteristic confusion. In most cases, the best solution is congressional
amendment to tighten the tax classification.19 The next best solution is allow6

Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455 § 2005, 90 Stat. 1872.
" Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-223, § 401.
"indivorce agreements, the parties must have been married to each other. In business sales, the seller must
have a business to sell.
"While it is not the primary purpose of this article to suggest how Congress should act, some general prinare alike should
ciples may provide guidance. A principle of horizontal equity states that transactions which
have the same tax consequences. This principle is violated if the parties can decide which of two classifications to use, leading to different tax results. Congress can either refine the categories to limit this freedom of
classification, e.g., H.R. Conf 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1497 (1984) (tightening the categories for divorce
agreements), or it can make the tax consequences of the two categories, such as "covenants not to compete"
and "goodwill," the same. See Beghe, Income Tax Treatment of Covenants Not to Compete, Consulting
Agreements and Transfers of Goodwill, 30 TAX L. 527, 623-24 (1977 (where the possibility that this has
been done by judicial action is suggested).
Neat solutions are sometimes not possible, such as where the potential fact patterns are diverse and have
to be fit into all-or-nothing tax categories. Unfortunately for those cases, the tax system is not yet
sophisticated enough to provide sliding tax categories with sliding tax consequences. Except for "parties'
choice" divorce payments cannot yet be classified as 25% child support and 75% alimony. However, in
other areas it is possible to alter the sytem.

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[Vol. 3

ing the Treasury to make the decisions in ambiguous classifications, expressly
allowing "parties' choice" in those situations open only to a limited number of
players.20 However, sometimes neither option is open, and a court must resolve
the classification dispute.
1. Business Sales
The first transaction is the sale of a business, often a small closely-held
proprietorship selling out to a chain. The chain purchases various assets such
as real estate, fixtures, and inventory." The chain also purchases two other
assets which are difficult to value, goodwill and a covenant (from the seller) not
to compete,22 thus creating an opportunity for tax reduction sales. The amount
paid in excess of the market value of the business assets can usually be
allocated either to goodwill or to the seller's covenant not to compete.23 This
allocation leads to different tax consequences for the seller24 and the buyer.25
2

See supra note 5.
See, e.g., Schwartz v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. (P-H) 60,228 (1960) (goodwill, fixtures and equipment).
22
The seller gives a covenant not to compete, usually within a specific geographic area and for a limited time.
A consulting contract might also be part of the package.
23
The allocation may have some effect on the damages which may be collected for a violation of the covenant under state law and some effect on the balance sheet. In any event, these considerations are frequently
minor. The holder of the covenant will often want an injunction rather than money damages to protect his
purchased business, and a sophisticated reader of balance sheets will not be swayed by a difference in allocation. But see Frank Lyon Co., supra note 1, where the fact that debt was listed on the company's balance
sheet was important to the Supreme Court.
2
The seller is generally taxed at capital gains rates for the depreciable and nondepreciable assets in the
business sold (the buyer then takes the market value as his basis for each asset). As to goodwill, the seller is
taxed at capital gains rates. Davee v. United States, 444 F.2d 557 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (sale of an unincorporated
market research publication). This gain has the additional advantage of not being allocated to a nondepreciable asset, avoiding any potential recapture as ordinary income as might be on amounts allocated to
depreciable assets. See I.R.C. §§ 1245 and 1250 (1984). Therefore, if the price is set the seller will want as
much allocated as possible to this asset.
As to the covenant not to compete (or a consulting contract), the seller is taxed at ordinary income rates
for amounts allocated to these assets. These assets represent a personal contractual agreement to forebear
from an otherwise allowed course of action. Beals' Estate v. Comm'r, 82 F.2d 268 (2nd Cir. 19361 (stock
received by officers of selling corporation for covenant).
From a tax standpoint allocations to a "consulting contract" appear to offer many of the same tax effects
as a covenant not to compete, including a deduction to the buyer and ordinary income to the seller.
Balthrope v. Comm'r, 356 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1966) (undifferentiated amount allocated to covenant and consulting services). At present, one might be concerned about subjecting the payments to Old Age, Survivors.
and Disability Insurance (I.R.C. §§ 3101(a) and 311 1(c); 5.7% on wages for both employee and employer
through 1987) and to Hospital Insurance (I.R.C. §§ 3101(b) and 311 l(b); 1.45% to both after 1985)). With a
total of 14.3% on a greatly expanded wage base, the scale tips toward covenants not to compete. Davee, 444
F.2d at 557.
-"The allocations are made to the various business assets. Most of the assets have a measurable value with a
resulting fairly straightforward taxation. The taxation of two other assets, goodwill and the covenant not to
compete, are also straightforward. However, since they are unique assets, the amount allocated to each and
the consequential taxes of the parties can vary. If the purchase price is set, the seller generally wants more
allocated to goodwill, while the buyer wants more allocated to the covenant.
The buyer generally also takes the market value established by the parties for the goodwill. He can
recover his basis only upon sale of the business. Goodwill, unlike the covenant not to compete, is
nondepreciable.
As to the covenant not to compete, the buyer can amortize the covenant over its useful life and recover
his investment as a deduction against ordinary income. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3(a) (1960). Presumably there
isan argument that the covenant has a useful life different from its term. If the seller does not begin to com2
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The allocation between goodwill and the covenant not to compete frequently
benefits both parties at the expense of the Treasury.
Usually, the chain is in a higher marginal tax bracket than the seller. If all
of the going concern premium is allocated to the covenant not to compete, the
aggregate taxes paid by both parties is lower. This tax savings can be shared between them by an upward adjustment in the purchase price. 6 The opportunity
for this deal arises because there is no easy way of determining the market
value of either the goodwill or the seller's covenant not to compete. The response of the courts and the Treasury to this transaction will be considered in
more detail later. In summary, if the parties report consistently (i.e., both allocate the same amount to goodwill or to the covenant), then the Treasury basically follows a "parties' choice" classification rule. The courts are more inclined
to quest for an unknowable transactional "substance." Confusion results.27
2. Divorce Agreements
The second transaction is divorce and the allocation of periodic dollar

pete within the term, he probably will not compete. Therefore, the protection (it
can be argued) really extends beyond the term. Besides being antithetical to the buyer's desires to write the covenant off quickly, this
argument might lead to the covenant being nondepreciable. See J.1.
Case Co. v. United States, 32 F.Supp.
754 (Ct. Cl. 1940).
-"For illustration, suppose the premium is $5,000, the seller is retiring and will pay no taxes, and the buyer
has enough other income that he is in the 50% marginal bracket. Assume further that $5,000 more or less
won't change the tax brackets of either party. If they allocate $5,000 to the goodwill which the buyer is getting, the seller pays capital gains tax (of zero in this example but never more than 20%), and the buyer does
not get any tax benefit until the business is sold. Goodwill is not depreciable. If, on the other hand, they allocate $5,000 to the covenant not to compete, then the seller has $5,000 of ordinary income (again zero tax in
this example), and the buyer has an amortizable asset. He can amortize this $5,000 over five years and generate a $1,000 tax deduction worth $500 each year for those five years. The present value of this $500 saving
each year is about $1802 (using a rough 12% inflation/interest assumption; and the effects of I.R.C. §§ 483
and 1274 (imputed interest) have been disregarded). If the seller is alert he will ask for about half of this savings in the form of a $900 higher price for the business. Frequently, neither he nor his counsel are alert.
"[11t takes no more than a cursory examination of the case law to disclose that the decisions in this area are
in bewildering disarray." Prouix v. United States, 594 F.2d 832, 833 (Ct. Cl. 1979).

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[Vol. 3

payments to alimony, 8 child support,29 and property settlements." Divorce
payments are a fertile source of material for the present discussion. There is an
illustrative contrast between the treatment of pre- 1985 child support payments
and property settlement payments; there is a contrast between poor and rich
divorcers; and in 1984, Congress attempted to tighten the categories, providing
a contrast between the law before and after January 1, 1985.
The reader will remember that one key characteristic of the divorce transaction which allows the Treasury to group it with business sales is the selflimiting nature of the transaction. Only parties who have been married can
play, making it unsuitable for general tax shelter promotion.
Dollar payments are fungible and, prior to 1985, could be categorized
with some flexibility as alimony, child support, or property settlement
payments. The consequences of these classifications were different to the husband and wife. "Alimony" alone among the three potential categories is deductible to the husband and taxable to the wife. Thus, the opportunity for a tax
reduction sale occurred when the husband's anticipated post-divorce marginal
tax bracket was higher than his wife's. Therefore, within the general adversity
1982 census figures indicate 15% of the 17 million divorced women were awarded alimony. 780,000
women were due alimony payments, the average amount of which was $3,000, and 43% received full payment. See generally BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 3, No. 124 (May 1982) (Advance Report Series) [hereinafter
cited as ALIMONY 1981). Estimating for partial payments, which the survey did not catalogue, approximately $1.5 billion in alimony payments were reported paid in 1982. This matches closely with $1.4 billion
alimony payments (317,335 returns) reported as income in 1979. 1980 TAX STATISTICS, Table 1.2. (It should
be noted that the number of tax returns reporting alimony as income is about half of the census count of
women receiving alimony. Furthermore, the average payment reported for tax purposes was greater, or
about $4,500 per woman.)
Not surprisingly slightly more than half again as many ex-husbands (534,000) reported paying deductible
alimony in more than half again the aggregate amount ($2.3 billion) reported by the women. 1980 TAX
SI'AIIsrics. Table 1.3. Women probably under-report more than men over-report so the actual alimony paid
is probably about $2 billion.
The average male income was $13,110 in 1978 and $16,520 in 1980. (CURRENTPOtPUIAION Rti'oRIS.
SERIES P-60, No. 134 (table 12). The median income of never-divorced women was $8,141 in Spring, 1982.
ALIMONY 1981, Table 4. The women's numbers are a somewhat deceptive guide to income subject to tax
because the definition of income in the census survey included, among other things, social securilty, supplemental security income, public assistance, and child support. Average 1979 salaries and wages reported
was approximately $9,000 for men and $7,000 for women. 1979 STAt IS IlCSot- INCOME: INDIVIDUAl. IN iMI.
FAX RETURNS. TREAS. PUB. 79 (3-82) (hereinafter cited as 1979 TAX SiAtist CS or 1980 TAX SrATHSi K S).
In 1985, the average husband's marginal tax rate was approximately 31% (I.R.C. § I(c)(unmarried): the
average woman's 17% (I.R.C. § l(b) (head of household). The spread is 14%. (These are obviously rough
figures but should provide some guidance). The spread obviously can be up to 50% and could have been
more before the reduction in the maximum marginal rate to 50%. C Wright v. Comm'r. 543 F.2d 593,171h
Cir. 1976) (husband was in the 70% marginal bracket).
If the Treasury contributes an average 20¢ per dollar, the greatest cost to the Treasury for sales of tax
reductions in divorce agreements is about $400 million. This foregone revenue from tax reduction sales is
.16% of the $250 billion in total income tax collected in 1980. 1980 TAX SiA tIsrIs,
Table A.
")fthe approximately 8 million women living with a child under 21 years, about 6t)% were awarded child
support aggregating $10 billion due and $6 billion received ($2,000 average) for 1981. ALIMONY 1981 at 2.
This is about three times the estimated alimony paid; see supra note 28. The stakes in characterization of
child support, then, are probably about one half of one-percent of the total income tax collected.
'Of the 14.2 million never-divorced (not separated) women in Spring 1982, 40 percent were awarded a property settlement. ALIMONY 1981.
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of divorce, there opened a zone of potential mutual cooperation."' If the parties
allocated more than they ordinarily would have to alimony, the husband could
take advantage of the wife's lower tax rates. Like business sale transactions, he
shared this with her in the form of higher payments. Much of this is still true,
but the new post-1985 law tightened the property settlement and child support
categories, reducing both ambiguity and the consequential potential for tax
reduction sales between divorcing husband and wife. 2
C.

Resolving Difficult Tax Classification Cases In the FirstPairof Transactions

Neither the progressive rate structure, nor some form of hidden tax expenditure, adequately adds to a discussion of the "parties' choice" method of
tax classification in hard cases. As to progressivity, the cases evidence little
concern for the progressive rate structure in the actual federal income tax
system." This lack of concern will be explored in more detail. As to tax expenditures, while it is true that with its impenetrable hedge of jargon and numbers,
the tax system is an ideal vehicle within which to hide tax expenditures.
Nevertheless, one can dismiss fairly quickly the suggestion that this explains
why the "parties' choice" method of deciding difficult categorizations is allowed in business sales and divorce agreements. Not only does it seem bizarre
to subsidize women with high-bracket former husbands, but well-counseled
women as a group would do better if their former husbands could be assured
that their wives could be held to their bargains. Subsidizing business sales
through this awkward method seems only slightly less likely. The business sale
and pre-1985 property settlement cases indicate that this is not what was happening. Other reasons for using "parties' choice" must be found.
:'This zone has been frequently overlooked by the parties. Schottenstein v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 451, 457 (1980)
(husband successfully reneges on his agreement: "the negotiations ... were protracted, acrimonious, and an
arms length"); Sydnes v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 170, 172 n.2, affd 577 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1973) (the husband "stated to [wife's] attorney that under no circumstances would he pay or agree to pay any support, maintenance,
or alimony. He also ... stated ... that he would leave the country before he would pay her one cent of
alimony."); Bishop v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 720, 726 (197 1) ("These negotiations were protracted and bitter, and
were accompanied by charges and counter-charges of infidelity and bad faith.").
"Title IV, §§ 411-492, 432 Pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1497 P.L. 98-369 (1984).
"See, e.g., Lester, 366 U.S. at 299 (parties allowed to "fix" child support payments and thereby sell tax reductions); Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 561 (sophisticated sale-leaseback involving a bank headquarters upheld).
None of the cases read for this article directly discussed the progressive rate structure.
'See Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and Emerging Issues. 20
B.C.L. REV. 225 (1979). See also OFFICE OF THE MANAGEMENT & BuDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS G: TAX ExPENDITUREs, THE BuDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984. Tax expenditures should be (but usually are not) distinguished from tax incentives. The former divides the national pie. The later attempts to increase it. One of
the reasons for allowing partnership special allocations was to allow sophisticated financing arrangements
which might otherwise be inhibited, even if a price of allowing these arrangements was the sale of tax reductions. This is a tax incentive motive.
"Since it was often poor former wives who were before the court trying to avoid taxability of cash payments
clearly labeled "property settlement," case law seems to have shifted toward allowing them to show the "substance" of the transaction and avoid taxability.
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The best explanation for resort to the "parties' choice" method of tax
classification is ease of administration by the courts and the Treasury. As the
pre-1985 child support cases show, the "pailies' choice" criteria has the advantage of deciding otherwise undecidable cases at relatively low cost. The tax
results can be read from the parties' agreement.
The following discussion will look in more detail first at using a transaction's "substance" as a means of resolving difficult classification problems; second at "parties' choice" as an alternate means; and then, third, suggest another
possibility.
1. Using a Transaction's "Substance" to Resolve Difficult Classification
Issues
Courts are adept at classifying transactions according to their substance.
That is, the court looks at the "substance" or "real nature" of the fact pattern
offered as a candidate for a statutory definition and then at the configuration
of the proffered statutory definition. Absent compelling policy reasons for denying or requiring statutory inclusion, the court uses the fact pattern's
substance to determine its proper classification. With this general statutory approach, it is not surprising to find courts preferring to use this classification
method in questionable tax cases. 6
However, the "substance" method of classification breaks down when
there are many difficult transactions to classify or when using a "substance"
standard yields no results. In the divorce cases, there are well over one million
divorces per year. Determining whether certain periodic payments are "property settlement" or "alimony," or whether business sales payments are attributed
to "goodwill" rather than a "covenant not to compete" frustrated more than
one pre-1985 court. Sophisticated courts understand that sometimes classifying according to a transaction's "substance" simply does not work or does not
-work well. 8 Other methods must be used.
2. "Parties' Choice" as an Alternate Method
The "parties' choice" method is the alternate method most employed for
the business sales area, Hamlin's Trust v. Comm'r, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954) is usually cited for the
proposition that the substance of the allocation controls.
"ITlhe task of distinguishing between payments for support and payments for other marital rights [is] a virtually insurmountable one for the courts." COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, His, HERS OR THEIRS? FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF DIVORCE PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS 6 (1983) (prior to the 1984 changes). See also Beard
v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1275 (1981) (property settlement case) praying for legislation to clean up the mess, a
prayer mostly answered in Section 422(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1984.
"Lester, 366 U.S. at 299 (Court abandons substance of "child support" for "parties' choice" standard); and
3In

Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 561 (Court abandons substance for "parties' choice" in sophisticated sale-lease-

back).
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resolving disputes. 9 The "substance" method narrows the choices to the difficult ones; then, "parties' choice" is used to complete the classification.
As one might expect, the Treasury has been more liberal in adopting the
"parties' choice" standard than the courts. This is shown in the quite different
standards for business sales adopted by the two sorts of tribunals. With
business sales, the Treasury is often willing to allow the form chosen by the
parties to resolve disputes between them, holding them rigidly to their contractual allocation. ° Its preferred standard, the "fraud" standard, allows the parties
to challenge the tax consequences of the business sale agreement only on
grounds which would allow state rescission of the contract, such as mistake,
fraud, and duress."
"'Id. See also Note, Treatment of Covenants not to Compete: A Problem Purchase Price Allocation, 67
YALE L.J. 1261 (1958) which makes the concluding argument that the parties be allowed to allocate freely
between themselves in order to achieve predictability of result and save expenditures "for investigation and
litigation on the question of true value." Id.at 1270.
'Itis unclear from the cases how many consistently reported allocations are challenged by the Treasury
since the cases usually do not indicate how the other party reported the transaction for tax purposes. O'Dell
& Co. v. Comm'r, 61 T.C. 461 (1974) (Treasure loses) is the only case found by the author where the Treasury attacked a consistently reported business sales transaction. Cf Patterson v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (P-H)
85,053 (1985) (where the I.R.S. went after the seller of Long John Silvers and lost).
If the Treasury does not attack the allocation, who does? In business sales, the answer is the seller, who
often finds out that he has unknowingly bargained away substantial tax benefits to the buyer. In divorce
agreements, it is usually the former wife. Sale-leasebacks and partnership special allocations are invariably
attacked by the Treasury, not the parties. There is even an amusing case where the Treasury urged more deductions on a taxpayer who resisted claiming any of them. Sellers v. Comm'r, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 77,305,
77,308 (1977) (attorney-partner selling losses to his doctor-brother).
In business sales, the covenant may be patently specious. Nevertheless, the buyer has undoubtedly deducted his amortization for prior years, some of which may be closed under the 3-year statute of limitations.
In this context, courts are torn between, on the one hand, holding the taxpayer to his form-over-substance
bargain and violating the principle that the tax consequences follow from the substance of what was done,
and on the other hand, following the substance-over-form principle and throwing the burden on the Treasury to catch the discrepancy quickly. See the conflict in Danielson between the majority and the dissent, infra note 49.
In divorce agreements, after initially challenging some of the "property settlement" reclassifications on
the merits, the Treasury (but not the courts) apparently became less interested in determining whether a payment is in substance "alimony" or a "property settlement." It often takes the auditing position that the form
of the transaction will be respected if reported consistently by the parties.
In cases where the Treasury is allowing "parties' choice," fairness to unsophisticated taxpayers suggests
that the Treasury's position be spelled out in the regulations. Cf.Treas. Reg. § I.1232-3(b)(2)(ii)(b) (providing
when agreement as to reasonable allocation between bond and another part of an investment unit will be respected).
4
1Comm'r v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (1967), vacating and remanding to the Tax Court, Danielson v.
Comm'r, 44 T.C. 549 (1965), over the dissent of Chief Judge Stanley.
The facts of Danielson present almost no ambiguity as to what the Treasury and the Third Circuit intended with the new test. In purchasing the stock of a small loan company for $374 per share, the buyers allocated $152 per share to a covenant not to compete in an agreement signed by the sellers, most of whom had
neither the inclination nor ability to compete. At the time of execution of the agreements, one of the Isellers)
was a 93 year old retired businessman. He rarely left his home. Furthermore, his affairs were conducted by
his wife. "Of the remaining [sellers], there were housewives with no knowledge of the small loan business ...
lOne of the other remaining sellers) was in real estate and insurance work, residing and doing business some
60 miles beyond the area covered in the covenant. [The next to last seller] was a busy and successful
surgeon." 44 T.C. at 557. Only one of the sellers was in a position to compete effectively. The buyer made no
effort to evaluate and compensate him for his competition potential. Rather, the buyer carefully calculated
the overall savings from allocating such a large portion of the purchase price to the covenant and passed
much of this savings along to the sellers in the form of a higher price.
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The general approach of the courts on business sales is different. After
many muddled decades, 2 the Tax Court and all but one of the circuits adopted
a doctrinally different "strong proof" standard, which is technically a procedural limitation; that is, tax consequences flow from the substance of the
transaction. However, procedurally, the substance is shown by allocations in
the contract unless the taxpayer can proffer "strong proof" that the contract
The sellers were told that there were some tax advantages to the buyers. However, they were not told that
the price was higher because of the covenant nor the tax consequences to them. They did not understand the
tax consequences of the agreement. The Tax Court found that the sellers had sustained their burden of
"strong proof" that the allocations to the equation did not square with the substance of the transaction.
On appeal, the Third Circuit took the Treasury's form-over-substance approach and reversed. The test
was somewhat narrower than that which the Treasury was urging in the Tax Court. The test announced by
the Third Circuit (and never adopted beyond that circuit) was: "A party can challenge the tax consequences
of his agreement as construed by the Treasury only by aducing proof which in an action between the parties
to the agreement would be admissible to alter that construction or show its unenforceability because of mistake, undue influence, fraud, duress, etc."
A misunderstanding of law is generally not a sufficient ground for rescission. The law is available for
everyone to know. The intent here is to require the seller to take the more burdensome step of suing the buyer to make himself whole without involving the Treasury in the dispute.
As stated, the "rule" is one sided and leaves open an attack by the Treasury (but not the parties) on the
contractual allocation. The Tax Court opinion clearly indicates that the Treasury was arguing for a broader
rule more like Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (holding the parties have absolute right to "fix" child support without
fear of attack by the Treasury). Danielson, 44 T.C. at 555.
In arriving at the Danielson rule, the Third Circuit believed there was no problem with the selling of tax
reductions because the Treasury could always step in and challenge egregious cases. Danielson, 378 F.2d at
778. The court made it clear that there were two principal reasons for these rules, reasonable predictability
and administrative convenience. It wanted the parties to be able to rely on the tax agreement, Id. at 775.
Furthermore, it wanted the Treasury to be able to accept contracts at face value without having to go back
to relitigate the substantive provisions.
Judge Stanley's dissent cogently presents opposing arguments which have proved persuasive in limiting
the "fraud" rule to the Third Circuit. His position is applicable also to "strong proof' requirements as well.
See Judge Rives' dissent in Balthorpe, 356 F.2d at 34 where he finds the allocation too much of a sham.
Stanley stated: "Taxes depend on what is done, and to allow the parties to shift the tax burden, even willingly, is beyond the power of Treasury..." Judge Stanley's position might be undermined in a way not contemplated by the court. No one has the power to force the Treasury to collect taxes. It has an almost unlimited
power of compromise on particular issues, either on individual cases or in general. Therefore, if it chooses to
allow the parties to contractually sell tax reductions, it can accept the lower taxes involved, it might read the
contract as a contract to pay another's taxes, which is in essence what the sale of tax reductions represents.
By agreement to a wholly fictitious covenant not to compete, the seller might be characterized as agreeing to
pay a portion of the buyer's taxes under a formula set by the Internal Revenue Code. So far, so good. The
problem is in not requiring the agreement to contain this express requirement: that the seller knowingly
understand that he is agreeing to the payment of extra taxes. See, e.g., Levinson v. Comm'r, 45 T.C. 380
(1966) (seller loses) where the buyer was careful to emphasize the tax reasons for the covenant, and the seller
admitted he understood the consequences of the allocation.
Presumably, everyone would be satisfied if there was an administrative requirement by the Treasury that
the seller must have understood that he was assuming part of the buyer's taxes while the Treasury authorized this assumption and administratively deleted from the buyer's gross income the payment of taxes (Old
Colony Trust Co..v. Comm'r; 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (payment of employer of employee's federal income taxes
constitutes additional income to the employee in the year of payment). The Treasury and the parties would
have their predictability, and the Treasury would be able to purchase administrative convenience at the
price of some limitation of revenue. Of course, as assignee of the contract, the Treasury would not have the
array of enforcement powers against the tax reduction buyer that it has against the primary taxpayer.
2
For years courts used the "severability" test to determine whether amotnts allocated to the covenant were
allowable, generally by the buyer. The test had some virtues since the buyer only received the benefits of
amortization of the covenant if there was proper proof of the amount allocated to the covenant. But, the test
was misfocused. Sellers began to argue that even carefully bargained for covenants were not "severable"
from the underlying goodwill they were designed to protect. The test fell into disfavor in the 1960s. See Balthorpe, 356 F.2d at 31 (seller loses).
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does not reflect the correct understanding between the parties. 3
The functional difference between this "strong proof" and the Treasury's
"fraud" standard lies is how the taxpayer can meet his "strong proof' burden.
An extremely high burden results in the Treasury's "fraud" standard by a different name, while a very low standard leads back to the problems with the
"substance" method of classification. How the taxpayer meets his "strong proof'
standard is confusingly unclear even within the Tax Court."
As to property settlement cases, these cases amply illustrate the confusion
caused by an inconsistent method of tax interpretation. Prior to 1985, the
divorcing parties could structure the transaction so that some or all of the postdivorce cash payments from husband to wife were classified as alimony rather
than as payments pursuant to a settlement of the parties' property rights." This
allowed wealthy husbands to deduct the payments from their income, saving
up to 50 cents in tax for each dollar deducted. The wife included that dollar in
her taxable income, paying perhaps 20 cents in tax. There was a 30 cents per
dollar savings by classifying the payment as alimony which they could split
between themselves by increasing the husband's net periodic payments to the
wife. In effect, the wife was selling her tax lower bracket to her husband.
Early in the 1970s, the Treasury unsuccessfully attempted to iinport the
fraud rule into the divorce property settlement area. Often the husband attempted to call payments both "property settlement" payments for state law
purpose, making them unmodifiable, and "alimony," making them
deductible.' Not infrequently, in the second or later years, as the tax conse"3Clesceri v. United States, 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-634 (1980) (discussion of varying standards among circuits);

Coven v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 295 (1976) (seller able to show "strong proof" that express allocation in superceding "tax" contract was unrealistic). The Tax Court opinion in Danielson, reversed by the Third Circuit,
found on similar facts that the sellers had met their "strong proof" burden. Danielson, 44 T.C. 549.
The "strong proof" test is as defective as the other tests developed in this area, being marginally better
than the unworkable "severability" test. The major problem is that courts can not impose a uniform standard of proof on themselves, thus, leading to identical cases being decided differently.
"Recent cases focus alternately on objective and subjective sub-tests. The objective test is whether a reasonable businessman looking to his future would bargain for the covenant. The subjective test is whether the
parties to the negotiation really bargained over the covenant. Under the objective test, the seller might show
that he was unable or unwilling to compete. Under the subjective test, the seller might show that there were
no negotiations and that the buyer slipped the covenant into the contract without negotiation.
Sometimes the Tax Court emphasizes one verbal formula, sometimes the other. Compare the results and
verbal formula of O'Callaghan v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (PH) 1 84,214 (1984) (verbal formula: whether there is
"some arguable relationship with business reality such that reasonable men, genuinely concerned with their
economic future, might bargain for such an agreement .... id. at 84, 219) with Goldstein v. Comm'r,
T.C.M. (P-H) 84,061 (1984), (verbal formula: the "key inquiry is whether the parties intended to allocate a
purchase price to the covenant").
These two cases are consistent in results even though the emphasis of the verbal formula differ. See also
Schulz v. Comm'r, 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961). The subjective test is really more than one test.' Sometimes
the parties' intent is taken as evidence of the importance of the covenant. At other times, it refers to their intent to allocate the tax burden between themselves.
'See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
"Wright v. Comm'r, 543 F.2d at 599 (wife loses) ("It is not uncommon for the parties to provide for such
payments, in lieu of alimony, where they wish to insure that the decree of divorce will not be subject to later
modification by the Court.") Roberts v. Comm'r, 43 T.C.M. (P-H) 74,175 (1974) (wife's attorney insists
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quences of her bargain begin to materialize for the wife, she, like the business
seller, challenged the classification of the "alimony" payments, arguing that
despite the allocation set out in the divorce agreement, the payments were, in
substance, not for her support. The Treasury's proffered "fraud" standard was
decisively rejected in two successive cases.47 Moreover, the parties were not
held to any unusual standard of proof, such as "strong proof," to overcome the
agreement's classification. The wife was often successful in reclassifying the
payments."
As to child support cases, a similar sale was possible when there were
minor children involved in the divorce. Child support is not deductible by the
husband. Allocation of some of these payments to alimony again allowed the
wife to sell some of her lower brackets in exchange for higher net payments.
Confusion similar to that found in the property settlement area reigned until
placed to rest by the United States Supreme Court in 1961. 41There the Court
had the wisdom to see that the traditional judical approach of trying to find a
transactional "substance" with which to classify the transaction did not work
in areas where the same transaction could with equal validity be classified in
more than one category with differing tax results to the parties. In effect, the
Court resolved this dilemma by allowing the parties to choose the category between them, reducing future controversies in that area.5" The number of child
support cases dropped after 1961 when the Court adopted a parties' choice
method. By contrast, the number of property settlement cases without such a
method continued unabated."
Sale-leasebacks are properly part of the second pair of transactions and
will be discussed in more detail in the next part, but it is appropriate to note
here that in the sale-leaseback area, the Supreme Court came to a similar conthat the payments be a "property settlement" since Washington state courts are thereby precluded from later
modification).
"Gerlach v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 156, 168 (1970); Mirsky v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 664, 674 (1971) (wife successfully

reneges). See also O'Callaghan, T.C.M. (P-H) 1 84,214 at 819 and Malgoire v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (P-H)
78,029, at 182 (1978) (where the Treasury was still unsuccessfully pushing the 1967 "fraud" position).
if as a factual matter, the payments appear to be genuinely for "alimony" or for "property settlement,"
then despite the parties' apparent agreement as to the tax consequences, they were quite successful in reneging and reclassifying the payments to their advantage (and the other parties' disadvantage). See Land v.
Comm'r, 61 T.C. 675, 677 (1974) where the agreement was explicit at two points expressing the following
agreement: "lit is the parties'] intention that this provision qualify under Sections 71, 72 or 215 of the Internal Revenue Code, for taxable income and deductible expenses of the parties hereto." Looking to the
substance of the transaction, the court found the payment was a property settlement despite this agreement.
This was not a consolidated case.
49Comm'r v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 304 (1961) (alimony deduction allowed father in unclear written divorce
agreement). The Court noted:
As we read lI.R.C. section 71(b)), the Congress was in effect giving the husband and wife the power to
shift a portion of the tax burden from the wife to the husband by use of a simple provision in the settlement agreement which fixed the specific portion of the periodic payment made to the wife as
payable for the support of the children.
Id. at 304.
"Lester, 366 U.S. at 299.
"Compare COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, supra note 44, at 6 with the limited number of cases after Lester in
1985 FED. TAXES (P-H) p. 7714.
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clusion, allowing "parties' choice" in a sophisticated financing transaction, a
principal purpose of which was to shift the tax benefits to one of the parties. 52
The "parties' choice" method does therefore resolve tax classification
disputes, but is not without problems of its own. Chief among these is the difficulty courts have with a shifting standard, where the "substance" criteria is
used to narrow and "parties' choice" to complete the classification. The cases
clearly indicate that the courts become confused and are not very adept at applying a shifting standard. This is indicated by the refusal to use any different
standard for property settlement cases and the refusal of courts generally to
adopt the Treasury's "fraud" standard.
Among other things, it is not clear when the shift from the "substance"
standard to the "parties' choice" standard occurs. In the pre- 1985 divorce child
support cases, there was at least a bright line threshold criteria: allocation was
allowed only if the parties had a minor child. But how much property is
enough in the pre-1985 property settlement cases? And in the business sales
area, what happens when a 93 year-old man wants to "sell" a covenant not to
compete, even though he is clearly too enfeebled to compete effectively. 3
This is essentially a problem of assuring uniform tax results for similar
fact patterns. Confusion results unless all of the decision makers (the parties,
the Treasury, and the courts) agree (1) on when the shift occurs, (2) on the conditions under which "parties' choice" will be observed, and (3) on who is bound
by the "parties' choice" standard.
The pre-1985 child support area provides the best example of a "parties'
choice" standard which worked reasonably well. The condition of the shift was
that the parties had a minor child. The 1961 Supreme Court case effectively
granted them absolute power to allocate payments between "alimony" and
"child support," enforceable between themselves and against the Treasury.
The parties, the Treasury and the courts, were all bound by the parties' decision. This effectively gave them the power to transfer taxable income to the
wife's more lightly taxed brackets.
The shift in business sales and in sale-leasebacks, among others, does not
work as well. There is no clear line for when the shift in standard occurs.
Ironically, a conscientious court which works hard to find the transaction's
"substance" may reach a different result than a court which summarily
disposes of the case with "parties' choice." This is a bad result for those who
52Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 561.

"The Rule against Perpetuities brought certainty to property law by conclusively presuming an 80 year old
woman could bear children. The Treasury's "fraud" standard, particularly as proposed in the Tax Court,
would effectively reach the same result by allowing the Treasury (and the parties) to lift the tax consequences from the face of the document, just as the Rule against Perpetuities allows courts to determine ab
initio the validity of future interests from the granting instrument and the parts at the time the grant
becomes irrevocable.
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believe similar cases should have similar tax results.
Another problem with the "parties' choice" method is the problem of the
overreaching or cheating party, who tricks agreement to the tax deal without
his opponent understanding the agreement. A related problem is the attempt
by one of the parties to renege on the tax deal after it is fixed.54 The former is a
common problem with the first pair, business sales55 and divorcing wives.56 It is
almost never a problem with the second pair, presumably because everyone
knows what the tax consequences are. Furthermore, at least in the partnership
special allocation area the annual distribution print-outs are reported consistently on the partner's returns. One could argue this is essentially a non-tax
problem, proceed to draw the tax consequences from the "parties' choice"
paper transaction, and thus place the burden on the taxpayer's counselor to
know the tax consequences of the deal.57 If the objective is to reduce cases,
though, it might be better to refuse the sale of deductions unless there is an express contractual clause fixing the tax deal between the parties.
The whipsaw of the Treasury by the parties is an even more insidious
problem: both parties win everything at the expense of the Treasury.5 It is not
uncommon for lawyers purposefully to leave the classification blank, allowing
the parties to fill in their own classification at tax time.59 Divorced husbands
4

Smith v. Comm'r, 331 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1964) one of two partner-brothers agreed to take all partnership income as his income and pay the other's taxes, but filed a partnership return reneging on his agreement. The court held the taxpayer to his bargain.
"Payne v. Comm'r, 22 T.C. 526, 531 (1954) (where the court emphasized the buyer's duplicity).
While it is more common for the buyer to be duplictous, the seller may also take unfair advantage by
knowingly accepting extra compensation for agreeing to a particular tax result, then trying to get out of his
bargain after he has been paid. See Levinson v. Comm'r, 45 T.C. 380 (1966) (The seller knew and agreed to
the tax consequences of allocation of most of the purchase price to the covenant).
"The cases indicate that divorce attorneys (but not their female clients) understand the tax consequences.
Business lawyers frequently do not understand. Amusingly, attorneys are frequently found as business sellers. See Hamlin's Trust v. Comm'r, 209 F.2d at 762 (sellers unaware of tax consequences but are held to
their deal). Yale Law School graduates are apparently more perceptive, or luckier. Ballantine v. Comm'r, 46
T.C. 272 (1966).
57
J. Raum in O'Callaghan, T.C.M. (P-H) 84,214 (seller was misled by the buyer but loses to the Treasury
anyway) citing Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875) (stockholder required to pay for stock despite bad
advice by sellers).
"IV INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 424(10). ("goodwill v. covenant not to compete; ...alimony v. child support ....Every reasonable effort should be made to secure the return of the taxpayer on the other side of the
transaction to insure that he/she is not treating the transaction inconsistently . . .") Increasingly, the
Treasury has been throwing buyers and sellers into court together and remaining neutral on the allocation.
See Levinson, 45 T.C. 380 (contractual allocation upheld). It has been said that "[tihe strong proof" standard
does not apply in such business sales cases. Peterson Machine Tool, Inc. v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 72, 82 (1982)
(roughly one-third allocation allowed). Sellers have a much better chance of arguing that the contractual
allocation is unrealistic. See Malgoire, 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 78,029 at 180 (seller loses).
If reported inconsistently, the Treasury usually takes an inconsistent position as to both, consolidates the
two cases, and acts mainly as a stakeholder. See, e.g., Beard, 77 T.C. at 1275.
5'In

59

See Ballantine, 46 T.C. at 272 (The parties on both sides of the negotiating table knew of the tax consequences of the goodwill allocation and declined to make a specified allocation); and Miller v. Comm'r, 33
T.C.M. (P-H) 64,305 (1964) (The parties understood the tax consequences of the allocation and, unable to
agree, allocated a gross amount of $11,500 from the total $37,500 purchase price to "goodwill of said
business and for the covenant not to compete."
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claim twice the amount of "alimony" deductions as divorced wives report in income. One commentator, in discussing the leading sale-leaseback case,
derisively noted that both parties took the deduction for the property. °
This is essentially a control problem. Congress has taken the first step in
the post-1984 divorce area by requiring information with which to allow
matching the parties. Assuring consistent reporting is a way of easing, if not
resolving, the problem.
To summarize, in some areas, the "substance" standard leads to confusion
and an inability to resolve cases. "Parties' choice" allows for the resolution of
cases, but primarily because of a shifting standard leads to confusion.
3. A Suggested Alternative: Adopt a General Interpretative Position
Against Sales of Tax Reductions
The problems with "parties' choice" are sufficiently serious that consideration should be given to an alternative approach. Failing a Congressional
solution (or similar solution through delegation to the Treasury),6' one option
open to a court faced with a tax classification problem is a traditional one:
place the burden on the taxpayer and deny tax reductions to everyone. If a taxpayer wishes either to fit his transaction into a favorable category or resist the
Treasury's fitting him into an unfavorable one, he would have the burden.
Rigorously applied in each of the transactions examined here, though, the approach would result in the Treasury winning most cases, on both sides. In
business sales, the allocation may be to the covenant not to compete as to the
business seller but not to such covenant as to the buyer. In pre-1985 divorces,
former wives might have "alimony" income which is not classified as such as to
their former husbands. Finally, no one might "own" and thereby be able to
depreciate sale-leaseback property.
This approach has not been taken generally, except for the case where one
of the parties has already classified the transaction consistently and as to him
' Wolfman, infra note 80, at 1075. (criticizing the Supreme Court opinion in Lyon as well as the government's bungling of its advocacy before the Court).
"Many of the problems of "parties' choice" could be ameleorated by expressly giving the Treasury greater

legislative power to adopt "parties' choice" in difficult cases. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
Presumably the Treasury has more technical expertise. Congress provides a purer reflection of political
preferences. The courts are presumably the worst alternative since (1) many have no special expertise (except

the Tax Court); (2)bright line rules can not be provided; and (3) the courts have limited political accountability.
Two weak arguments can be made against this suggestion. First, it might be argued that taxpayers should
be able to rely on the Code as written without worrying about the possiblity of some interpretation, or lack
of enforcement, known only to specialists. Taxpayers or their advisors should have some assurance that

there is not a shifting standard of interpretation applied in different sections of the Code, making interpretation more uncertain and expensive. This is a weak argument because while one cannot reasonably expect a

taxpayer, or his advisor, to read every case before filling out his tax return or structuring his transaction, one
can expect him to read the Treasury's regulations. Second, one might argue that Congress, not the Treasury,
should determine the tax consequences of fact patterns presented for tax classification. This is a weak argument because such delegation is well within the boundaries of permissible Constitutional delegation.
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the classification stands because of the statute of limitations." It violates the
notion of fairness, essential to the system. The same definition should apply to
the same facts regardless of whether the Treasury can benefit from inconsistent definitions.
Another easily dismissed classification possibility is to allow both parties
to classify the fact pattern most favorably and both claim the tax benefits. Administratively, this obviously happens. As mentioned, the pre-1985 system of
matching up divorced husbands and wives produced twice as much "alimony"
deducted by ex-husbands as was reported by ex-wives; and in the leading saleleaseback case, both parties took the depreciation deduction.14
The new post-1984 divorce Section 71 suggests a promising solution for
resolving cases, and avoiding "parties' choice" while securing predictability. It
is to adopt a principle that the least favorable general position to taxpayers in
the aggregate should be taken unless the reduction buying taxpayer is able to
show that the deal should be classified in another way.
In business sales, the presumption would be that all of the extra value
would be allocated to goodwill (the general least favorable tax position). In
almost all transactions, the business seller will be happy to report this way,
because he receives capital gain treatment for the sale. The usual tax controversy would be between the business buyer and the Treasury. Courts could
require the buyer to show all of the following to overcome the presumption: (1)
that there was a covenant not to compete; (2) that there was a realistic chance
that the seller could have competed; (3) that, an amount was specifically
allocated to the covenant; (4) that this amount was reasonable under the circumstances; 65 (5) that the contract of sale described the tax consequences of the
covenant to the seller;" and (6) that the seller agreed to report the covenant's
income as taxable income rather than capital gain. The buyer should also have
to report the seller's income tax identifying number.
In the divorce area, the presumption, as it is in the post-1984 new divorce
provisions, would be against taxable income being shifted to the former wife.
The usual tax controversy would be between the former husband and the

"But see Peterson Machine Tool, Inc. 79 T.C. at 81 ("each party bears burden of proving..
"Patterson, [P-HI T.C.M. 85,053, (burden announced to court allows taxpayer to show no allocations).
"Wolfman, infra note 80.

"One might ask: (I) did the covenant have enough substance so that reasonable men might bargain for it?,
and (2)was an appropriate amount allocated to the covenant? See Levinson, 45 T.C. at 380 (where the court
is quite sure (I) is met but not (2)).
'Annabelle Candy Co. v. Comm'r, 314 F.2d I, 7 (9th Cir. 1962) ("rocky road" candy corporation buyout;
buyer no( allowed to challenge allocation) (where the court would hold the parties to their bargain since

otherwise the "tax consequences which they contemplated as incident to the benefits and burdens of the contract would be disturbed").
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Treasury.67
This judicial solution has the virtue of avoiding two methods of classification being applied to the same fact pattern. It yields a single classification for
both parties and avoids most of the other problems associated with either a
naked "substance" or an alternate "parties' choice" approach. In addition, it is
consistent with the approach which will be recommended in the second pair of
"tax shelter" cases discussed next.
The anti-sales solution is not perfect. One objection is that courts would
find it difficult to determine the pattern of tax sales with which to apply the
presumption. Yet, in the four transactions examined here, the pattern of tax
sales is almost patently obvious. Determining this pattern should be no more
difficult than determining the transaction's substance.
A more serious objection is that in cases where the tax positions of the
parties are reversed, interpreting against sales in the aggregatewill allow "parties' choice" and sales of tax deductions in the particularcase which runs
against the grain. For example, the rich woman receiving custody of her
children would be able to elect to characterize payments as "child support" (as
she is allowed under present post-1984 law), thereby purchasing her husband's
lower tax bracket. A court faced with this problem would have to either interpret against sales in the particular (and thereby against the woman) or in the
aggregate. The post-1984 divorce sections line up on the side of an aggregate,
rather than a particular, classification.68
In sum, because of problems with the "parties' choice" method of resolving questionable tax disputes, an alternate should be tried; that is, courts
should interpret against the sale of tax reductions. There is only limited
authority supporting this approach.69 It may, like the "severability" 70 and
"fraud"'" tests, prove to be a failure. However, it looks like a promising solution and should be tried.

""No sale" is the most beneficial to the Treasury, so it is no trick to make sure that the payment fails to

qualify under new I.R.C.

§§ 71(b)(l)(B) and 215 (1984), rev'g Lester, 366 U.S. 299.

""No sale" is easy to achieve. The parties can disqualify a tax reduction sale by fixing an amount as child

support. In addition, the new section independently finds a "no sale" when certain payments which are
reduced upon a child "attaining a specified age, marrying, dying, [or] leaving school..." 1.R.C. § 7 I(c)(2)(A).

While the committee reports reflect no hint of concern about sales of tax benefits pursuant to a "parties'
choice" standard, the net effect is to practically eliminate sales and strengthen the literal interpretation of
the Internal Revenue Code.
In the property settlement area, the new provisions also make a "no sale" easy to achieve. All the parties
have to do is designate the payment in the agreement as not being "alimony." There is an economic risk to

the wife. In order to be alimony, her benefits have to end at death. It is less clear whether the parties have an
equal power to effectuate a "sale." Id.
"Cf. Peterson Machine Tool, Inc., 79 T.C. 72 (Tax Court's substantive allocation to the covenant upheld).

"°See Balthrope, 356 F.2d at 31.
"See supra note 41.
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THE TAX SHELTER MARKET PROBLEM: HARM TO THE APPARENT FAIRNESS OF
THE TAX SYSTEM

A.

Progressivityand the Perceived FederalIncome Tax System
This part of the article centers on the second pair of the four transactions
examined, sale-leasebacks and partnership special allocations." Close analysis
of the limited number of cases in this second pair reveals a central problem
which is quite different from the first pair.
Like the first pair, ambiguity seems to require "parties' choice" for
decisive classification which in turn opens the door for sales of tax reductions.
The major difference is that these transactions, unlike the first pair, are not
self-limiting. Anyone can participate. Tax shelter promoters are a major force
here.73 Furthermore, the judicial response is different.
Naturally, one would assume that the difference arises because of the
greater possible effect on the tax system's progressive rate structure. Judging
from the cases, admittedly a limited research base from which to build an explanatory model, this is not the central concern. The leading cases do not
discuss the relative tax brackets of the parties.74 Once it is clear that one of the
parties is entitled to the deduction, courts, at least, seem unconcerned with
which party can take it. Judging from many of these cases and from other
evidence as well, one might conclude that progressivity in the upper tax
brackets is not a very important feature of the actual federal income tax
system, as opposed to the perceived system."
"These two transactional forms sometimes appear together in cases. See Hilton v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 305
(1980). (with a combined limited partnership and sale-leaseback).
"3The control the promoters have over the shelter vehicle eliminates the problems which were central in the
first pair. In this second pair, generally everyone reports consistently, and there is no "fraud" problem here.
7
See Estateof Starr, 274 F.2d 294 ("lease" of sprinkler system held a "sale.") The theoretical debate concerning progressivity as a structural feature of the federal income tax has been extensively explored elsewhere
and is beyond the scope of this article. See W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION (1953) (the classic critique of progressive taxation) and R. PAUL, THE STORY OF PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 714 (1954).
There is other data. See J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 127, Table 4-13 (1983) which shows that effective tax rates rise only to about 23% of "expanded adjusted gross income" of $1 million or more. See also
E. BROWNING & W. JOHNSON, THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE TAX BURDEN 63 (1979) (federal taxes of all types
reach 23.9 percent in the top tenth of income class, as defined in the study). 4:1 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 123
Table 3(14) (Summer 1984) The tax as a percentile of 1982 adjusted gross income (AGI) ranges from 27% of
$100,000 AGI to 40% at $1 million AGI.

"One must be clear about what one is calling the "actual" federal income tax system. While it is perfectly
sensible to talk about the collective illusion of a progressive system as part of the actual system, for clarity
that convention will not be adopted here. The "actual" system referred to is the tax system as it actually
works absent its "perceived" system. The perceived system is the collective image of the federal income tax
system.
Progressive rates on large incomes raise relatively little tax because such incomes encompass such a small
percentage of total income. Taxable income of those with $100,000 or more of adjusted gross income in
1980 was $84 billion or about one-half of one percent of the 1.3 trillion in 1980 adjusted gross income. 3:4
STAT. OF INCOME 92 Table 4(5) (Spring 1984). See also Soak the Rich? It Wouldn't Balance the Budget, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. 59 (Sept. 17, 1984) ("[llf all persons with income of $100,000 or more paid a 100 percent tax, [it would raise only] 68 billion in added revenue [for 19841.") The total estimated net worth of the
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The cases' approach indicates that progressivity has more of an administrative function. The main purpose of progressivity may be a contribution to
the general perception of the tax system's fairness, which is an essential administrative feature of an efficient, self-assessing income tax system.76 If this is
true, then this perception can be advanced by an apparently progressive system. It is not necessarily advanced by an actually progressive system. The best
system could even be one that was only apparently, but not actually, progressive.
One way of testing this proposition is to uncover cases where progressivity
is only apparently, but not actually, threatened. Here the cases in the saleleaseback and the partnership special allocation areas are especially revealing.
In many of these cases, the tax reductions being sold are benefits that any individual acting alone could have by a single investment. The harm apparently
is the fragmentation and marketing of these tax benefits to unrelated investors.
The Treasury's present auditing focus on tax shelters seems to corroborate this
analysis. A promoter almost by definition, has to tout his wares. The touting
itself, since it tarnishes the perception of fairness, may be the principal harm.
When, as in the business sales and divorce transactions, there seems little
likelihood that a national tax shelter market can develop, the cases do not seem
hostile to the sales of tax reductions.
The central role of taxpayers' perceptions in the tax system requires different conditions for satisfactory solutions in this second pair of transactions,
and by probable extension, to other forms of anyone-can-play sales of tax
reductions as well.
B.

Marketed Sales of Tax Reductions: Sale-Leasebacks & PartnershipSpecial Allocations
1. Sale-Leasebacks

The essential elements of a sale-leaseback transaction are a sale, a
four hundred richest Americans is $134 billion. A 100 percent income tax would yield only about $15 billion
annual revenue. By comparison the estimated 1985 U.S. budget deficit is $211 billion. FORBES, October 28,
1985, at 206.
Nor is it clear that such rates would actually perform other functions generally ascribed to them, such as
estate-leveling.

"6Such cases as Danielson (the "fraud" rule), Lester ("parties' choice" in child support discussed at supra note
33), Frank Lyon Co. ("parties' choice" in sale-leasebacks discussed infra note 80), and the partnership special
allocation provisions of I.R.C. § 704(b) (1984) can all be read as limitations on the actual progressivity of the
federal income tax system. This reading is wrong because if one is willing to allow actual progressivity to be
limited, one should be willing to do so through direct, rather than indirect, modification of the federal in-

come tax structure. The indirect method requires transactions costs (lawyers, accountants, and promoters)
of about 15%. See safe harbor leasing discussed at supra note 5.Administrative convenience for the tribunal
wishing to manage a case load economically and expeditiously is a much better explanation.
On the other hand, concern for the illusory tax system is probably the best reading of why such Ieading

cases as Orrisch v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 395 (1970) (partnership special allocation disallowed), Allison v. United
States, 701 F.2d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (partnership special intangible drilling cost allocation disallowed) and
Hilton, 74 T.C. 305 (taxpayer again loses in sale-leaseback case) refuse to follow the cases allowing "parties'

choice." Naked, open and notorious sales of tax reductions have a detrimental effect on the perceived tax
system. See infra note 75.
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lease(back) and frequently an option to repurchase." For convenience, the
cases analyzed in this article will be drawn from a small group closely akin to,
but more or less distinguishable from, other similar transactions.,8
An oversimplified example of a sale-leaseback illustrates the transaction.
Railroads (RR) need boxcars to operate. Boxcars are depreciable, but many
railroads until recently had no taxable income against which to write off the
depreciation deductions. Valuable tax deductions were simply lost each year.
However, if a railroad "sold" a boxcar to a high bracket investor such as a successful doctor (Doc) and then leased it back, the doctor would have depreciation deductions to offset his income, the railroad would have the boxcar to use,
and the lease payments would be adjusted to reflect a portion of the tax deductions now employed to reduce the Doc's taxes.79 Like business sales and divorce
agreements, the Treasury absorbs the total loss in tax revenue resulting from
the reallocation of tax benefits."
The sale-leaseback cases are a sort of do-it-yourself version of the congressionally sanctioned safe-harbor leasing allowed primarily in 1981 and 1982.81
The critical difference is that these transactions cannot be merely paper transactions. Furthermore, sale-leasebacks, unlike the business sales and divorce
"See e.g. the steps in a sale-leaseback decision summarized at 435 of Shurtz, A Decision Model for Lease
Parties in Sale-Leasebacks of Real Estate, 23 WM & MARY L. REV. 385 (1982).
"Transactions falling under the rubric "sale-leaseback" cover a wide diversity of arrangements and purposes,
both economic and tax. For convenience, this discussion will be limited to sale-leasebacks, even though a
straight lease can have many of the same economic and tax functions. It will ignore gift-leasebacks in which
the seller-lessor is attempting to transfer wealth gratuitously. See McMillion v. United States, 24 A.F.T.R.2d
5699 (1969) (taxpayer wins), The discussion will also ignore sale-leasebacks in which the seller-lessor is attempting to control the tax realization of an economic loss he sustained. Jordan March Co. v. Comm'r, 269
F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1959) (taxpayer wins.).
"Simonson, Determining Tax Ownership ofLeased Property, 38 TAX. L. 1, 31 (1984). See also Faber, Determining the Owner ofan Assetfor Tax Purposes, 61 TAXEs 795-809 (1983). Rev. Proc. 85-12, I.R.B. 1985-12,
p. 3 section 4(9) allows no advance rulings on this issue.
"Discussion of non-safe harbor sale-leasebacks must begin with the 1978 Supreme Court cases of Frank
Lyon Co. v.United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), rev'g 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976) which is analogous to Lester in the child support area. Lyons involved an Arkansas bank which found it could not finance a new
building for itself and had to turn to a sale-leaseback transaction. This transaction was structured so as to
provide only the most minimal risks to the nominal "owner" of the property, who borrowed all but $500,000
of the purchase price. The transaction probably could have been structured as a typical sale-leaseback, giving the bank the depreciation deductions. However, the transaction was structured to transfer those benefits
pursuant to the transaction to Frank Lyon Co., whose majority stockholder and board chairman also was a
member of the Arkansas bank's board. The Eastern District of Arkansas found the transaction was not a
sham and allowed Lyon Co. its deduction. 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-5154 (E.D. Ark. 1975.)
The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court reasoned that the transaction, viewed substantively, looked more
like a pure financing transaction in which the bank rather than Lyon was the owner of the building. The
court recharacterized the transaction to follow its substance and, consistent with the approach of prior cases,
held that the bank was the true owner of the building for tax purposes. 536 F.2d 746, 754 (8th Cir. 1976).
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and allowed the form of the transaction to control the tax
consequences. The Court allowed Lyon, the buyer-lessor, the depreciation tax reductions purchased. (In his
article, The Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A Failure of the Judicial Process 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075
(1981), Professor Wolfman notes that since the bank also had taken the depreciation deduction, the deduction had been allowed twice through administrative oversight.)
"See Riles, Safe Harbor Leasing, 1981 and 1982, 3:4 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. (1983). Those interested in all
the figures of an actual transaction should see Hilton, 74 T.C. 305 (partnership, taxpayer loses).
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transactions, are much more open to comparison with other comparable transactions. A covenant not to compete or a spouse may have a unique value.
However, a building lease or payments on a note can be easily compared with
other comparable arms-length transactions.
The sale-leaseback transaction cannot be used to sell tax reductions as
simply as the boxcar model depicted above. To illustrate, assume RR has
enough real losses that, no matter how much income is allocated it, it pays no
taxes. Correlatively, the tax shelter buyer (Doc) has enough income from his
medical practice that no matter how much depreciation is allocated to him, he
will still pay 50 cents in federal income tax on the last dollar of his taxable income. Ignoring ITC, assume further that the boxcar costs $10,000, is five-year
recovery property, the inflation/interest rate is about 10%, and that assets are
worth about ten times earnings. This transaction is difficult for Doc to structure because he must actually pay $10,000 for the boxcar to get a basis to
deduct. Over five years, as he depreciates his entire $10,000 basis, the taxes he
pays will be reduced by only $5,000. In fact, since not all of the reductions will
reduce current taxes, the present value of the stream of five-year deductions is
only about $4,000.
The very most Doc should be willing to pay for $5,000 of tax benefits is
the present value to him, about $4,000 cash. In order to get the rest of the
$10,000 basis for the boxcar, Doc must give RR a $6,000 note. Rental
payments will probably be keyed to Doc's principal and interest payments.82
This is the "paper" part of the transaction that separates the cases analyzed in
this section from the unreal, but congressionally sanctioned, safe-harbor leasing transactions which flourished in 1981 and 1982. Without the tax requirement for economic substance, there would be neither a $6,000 note nor rental
payments. Yes, Doc is the "owner" of the property if everything goes well.
However, the leaseback leaves RR in precisely the same economic position it
was in when it "owned" the boxcar. The $4,000 represents payment for the tax
deductions (not for the property).
Rental payments flowing toward Doc, therefore, approximate the principal and interest payments flowing back to RR. It is an economic wash, but
after the first few years not a tax wash. All of the rental payments are income.
Only the interest portion of the note payments is deductible. Increasingly then,
taxable income will flow back in Doc's direction and RR will get rental deductions it does not need. Again unlike the business sale and divorce cases, the
elements of these payments, lease, interest, etc., can be tested against an outside market to limit the flexibility of Doc and RR in structuring the payments
to offset this effect of a reverse flow.
I2Sowerly v. Comm'r, 53 T.C.M. (P-H)

84,021 (1984) (rent exactly offset interest and principal).
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2. Partnership Special Allocations
To a much greater degree than in the sale-leaseback cases, the term "partnership special allocations" denotes a method of transferring tax reductions used
in a family of related but distinct transactions rather than denoting the transaction itself. 3 Two methods are illustrated in the following examples.
The first is an example modeled loosely on a leading case. 4 RR contributes $3,500 and Doc contributes $5,000 to the RR/Doc partnership. The respective partnership "capital accounts" (roughly, what they could take out if
the partnership were liquidated) of each partner are $3,500 and $5,000. The
partnership buys an $8,500 boxcar, which is leased to RR. Real lease payments

are made by RR to the partnership representing the value to it of the boxcar of
about $1,500. The written partnership agreement allocates all of the first year's
$1,500 depreciation deduction to Doc, but requires him to reduce his capital
account by the amount of depreciation allocated to him from $5,000 to $3,500.
The partnership allocates all the current income to RR. RR is credited with
$1,500 in income, increasing its capital account from $3,500 to $5,000. Assume (somewhat unrealistically) that the boxcar is sold for $8,500 and the partnership is liquidated. RR gets $5,000 of the proceeds. Doc gets $3,500.5 Doc
has bought his $1,500 deduction (worth $750 to him) at double its value to
him.86
The second example of this family of partnership special allocation cases,
substituting "Oil" for "RR," is also drawn from a leading case.8 Oil contributes
'3The tax consequences (if successful) are as follows. A partnership is not a taxable entity. i.R.C. § 701
(1984). It determines its income, gain, loss, deduction, credit, and other attributes at the end of each taxable
year. I.R.C. § 703 (1984). In effect, it distributes them to the various partners for inclusion on the partner's
tax returns. I.R.C. § 702 (1984). Since 1954, a partnership has been generally authorized to allocate specially
those tax items to different partners by the partnership agreement unless the allocation does not have economic effect. Prior to 1976, the special allocation of partnership items was recognized under I.R.C. §
704(b)(1) (1975) for tax purposes unless "the principal purpose... Iwasl the avoidance or evasion of federal
income tax..." The most important test given by the regulations in determining whether the principal purpose was tax avoidance was "whether the allocation has 'substantial economic effect;' that is,whether the allocation may actually affect the dollar amount of the partner's shares of the total partnership income or loss
independently of tax consequences...." Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1975). In 1976, this test from the regulations replaced the code section it intereprets. Now, I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (1976) disallows a special I.R.C. §
704(b)(1) (1976) allocation if under the agreement the allocation does not have "substantial economic effect."
84
Orrisch v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 395 (taxpayer loses).
"The tax consequences are as follows. A partnership is not a taxable entity. It determines its income, gain,
loss, deductions and credits, and other attributes at the end of each taxable year and, in effect, distributes
them to various partners for inclusion on the partner's tax return. A partnership is authorized to allocate
specially these tax items to different partners by the partnership agreement unless it has been generally
authorized to allocate these tax items to different partners by the partnership agreement, assuming the
allocation does have substantial economic effect. I.R.C. § 704(b) (1984).
"Creating a deduction is easy. One only needs to walk through a tough neighborhood and get robbed,
generating a theft deduction. Sometimes, investing $100 with a promoter, out of which the agreement pays
him $20, leaving $80 to be actually put to work, is like the "theft" example. One has given up $20 in value to
get (at 50% marginal rate) a deduction worth $10. See Rudnitsky, Thefellow who sold the Brooklyn Bridge
to tourists might have done better packaging real estate syndications, FORBES, Dec. 19, 1983 at 143.
"Hamilton v. United States, 687 F.2d 408 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (special allocation recognized since the deal was
structured to follow transactions allowed in the regulations); Cf. Allison, 701 F.2d 933 (special allocation
denied because there was not reduction in capital accounts).
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nothing and Doc contributes $10,000 to the Oil/Doc partnership which will
drill for oil. All of the losses and gains (known as "bottom line allocations") are
specially allocated to Doc until the aggregate gains (when the well hits) allow
payment back of Doc's $10,000 contribution. At this time, the allocations shift
and Oil and Doc receive partnership income and liquidation proceeds in equal
portions. The economic reality of this agreement is that if the well is dry, Doc
has $10,000 of actual cash losses. Oil loses little since most of the risk is assumed by Doc. If the well hits, Doc gets his money back and half a producing
well. Oil also gets half a producing well.
Assuming again that Doc has enough other income to place him in the
fifty-percent bracket no matter how much loss is allocated to him, and Oil will
have no taxable income even if the allocation is disallowed, the special allocation will mean that Doc's net cost after allocation of initial losses will be
$5,000. If the well hits, he will recoup his $10,000 investment as income
(which if ordinary will reimburse the Treasury for the $5,000 in taxes saved).
After the shift, he and Oil will each have a half-interest in an oil well. The principal tax benefits to Doc are deferral and conversion into capital gain (if he sells
his interest in the well). The principal tax benefits to Oil are presumably the
conversion of his ordinary income labor into an interest in a well which can be
sold at capital gain as well as deferred; that is, not recognized except as income
from the well as received or when the well is sold.
The tax losses are obviously much more valuable to Doc than to Oil.
However, the partnership special allocation is not necessary to achieve these
results for Doc. Doc, and other innovators if necessary, could form a partnership and hire Oil, paying him either a salary or an equity share if the well hits,
without making him a partner. This deal could have been structured as a
straight investment by Doc along with Oil hired to drill and administer Doc's
oil business, for which Oil would receive a salary. The partnership form and
special allocation may be more for Oil's benefit than Doc's.
C.

Control of Tax Shelter's Harm to the Perceived Federal Income Tax
System

A surprisingly consistent composite picture of successful sales of tax
reductions emerges from the separate transactions examined. The picture is
out of focus, mainly because it is developed from an analysis of litigated transactions and only secondarily from legislative, administrative and other sources.
Furthermore, the picture is incomplete because there are fewer reported cases
for this second pair of transactions.
In these cases, the administrative convenience of the tribunal is an important, often decisive, force in the decision."8 Filtering out this doctrinal noise
"Unlike the first pair, there appear to be hints of tax expenditure motives, injecting some doctrinal confusion. The real estate artificial losses marketed through both sale-leasebacks and partnership special allocations seem to fall into this category. At least one lower court case allowed a special allocation in an oil shelter
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and disregarding the relatively insignificant pull of progressivity leaves the
analyst with a residue from which to make generalizations.
Courts have not yet sorted out two quite different problems in this second
pair of transactions. As with the first pair of transactions, courts are faced with
a mismatch between the real world events (fact patterns) presented for tax
classification and the definitional classifications into which to pigeonhole
them. If the second pair of transactional cases is analyzed correctly, "parties'
choice," in a game open to everyone, leads to promoters marketing tax shelters
and thereby to the perception that the tax system is unfair. Since compliance
and political acceptability is crucial to the tax system, any attack on the
perception of the system's fairness must be met at one or more points. While
courts have not yet recognized this interest doctrinally, they are faced with the
additional problem in this second pair of transactions, that of protecting the integrity of the perceived tax system, the system as seen by taxpayers.
The perceived federal income tax system cannot be protected directly. In
our political system, the dissemination of information to the public cannot be
controlled directly,89 nor would anyone suggest this as a solution.
There is no such constitutional limitation on an indirect attack. Among
other things, one could limit the fragmentation of interests and thereby the
potential for marketing these interests widely. For example, one could tax partnerships with more than 35 partners as corporations. Alternatively, one could
reduce the profit margins from the sale of tax reductions by imposing onerous
S.E.C. reporting requirements on the sale or by imposing costly audits on the
transactional medium, sale-leaseback or partnership. However, once the goal is
clear that one is attempting to limit the flow of accurate information about the
real tax system, the propriety of this goal becomes questionable.
Arguably the appropriate response is to make the actual tax system fairer.
One could avoid headlines such as "Over 3,0.00 millionaires paid virtually no
federal income tax in 1983 .- "0 simply by requiring each taxpayer to pay
some tax on real economic gain each year.
because of what appeared to be a congressional purpose to encourage oil exploration. (It is consistent with
these tax preferences expenditures that they be purchased along with the underlying investments.)
One can explain sales of tax reductions largely on the basis of administrative convenience. However, in
some anyone-can-play cases it is also possible to argue a tax expenditure purpose: to encourage people to invest in real estate or drill for oil. Congress attaches a tax carrot to the activity. Some have argued that allowing the naked sale of this carrot further enhances its value to the person engaged in the activity and is intended by Congress as an additional subsidy. Allison v. United States, 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9,163 (Ct. Cl. 1982) rev'd
on this point, 701 F.2d 933. Cf.Note, The Participationof Charitiesin Limited Partnerships,93 YALE L.J.
1355 (1984) (arguing that a charity should be able to sell its tax exempt status as a third subsidy in addition
to exemption from corporate income tax and the ability to receive deductible donations).

"U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
0DAILY TAX REPORT, August 2, 1985 ("ITIhe new report is important because it shows the ability of taxpayers with substantial 'economic' income to avoid income tax by investing in loss-producing tax shelters")
see also The Miami Herald August 2, 1985 at I (same story), Some Rich Getting Free Tax Ride.
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Next, since it does not necessarily follow that making the system fairer
automatically increases the taxpayer's perception of its fairness, accurate information concerning the fairness of the actual system should be disseminated.
Making the system fairer is primarily a legislative job. Arguably
disseminating this information is an administrative one. However, what is the
appropriate judical response to this second pair of transactions, similar to the
first pair, where the classification is doubtful but "parties' choice" is a particularly dangerous standard of classification?
From the second set of cases, it is evident that courts generally resist sales
of tax reductions, particularly in egregious cases where the tax reductions are
being separated, like the sizzle from the steak, and marketed separately. The
trend in the decisions is evident even though the opinions do not yet articulate
the reason for the results.
Among other things, courts have resisted the separation and independent
sale of the tax reductions by requiring an economic threshold.9' In other words,
they require the transaction, and even the allocation of tax reductions within
the transaction, to have some reality other than as a naked sale of tax reductions. The reader will recall that in the first pair of transactions, this was not a
fundamental problem. The tax reduction could not be separated from the rest
of the transaction since it could only be marketed to the business buyer or to
the husband. The overall transaction had economic substance. The business
buyer was paying for the business assets as well as the seller's lower tax brackets. The husband was similarly paying dollars to the wife. For mainly administrative reasons, the cases in that first pair did not reflect a requirement
that the allocation to the more favorable category (covenant or alimony) have
some independent justification.
Courts are not yet clear on what counts as an economic threshold. It
seems to require a gamble.92 This gamble may be one of upward economic
potential. One court required that the present value of the expected economic
gain be greater than the present value of the tax reductions.93 Other courts
'Rev. Rul. 83-47, 1983-1 C.B. 63 (no depreciation allowed lessors in townhouse sale-leaseback).
1"Kresser v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 1621 (end of year adjustment to partnership agreement disallowed; value of
tax reductions calculable with precision); see also Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395 (sale of tax reduction disallowed
where the value of the depreciation deduction was also determinable).
"Hilton, 74 T.C. 306 (naked sale through leaseback disallowed). See also Rev. Proc. 75-28, 54.07(1), 1975-1
C.B. 752 and I.R.S. Manual (audit) section 4236-872 (present value analysis for tax shelters). Hilton followed
Lyon by two years. (The reader will recall that Lyon involved the Arkansas bank that was allowed by the
United States Supreme Court to market its tax reductions on the ground it was impossible to determine the
"true" owner in many sale-leaseback cases. Hilton involved a transaction which seems scarcely
distinguishable from Lyon except that tax reductions were not sold to a single well established company but
were rather clumsily fragmented through a tiered partnership and marketed to unrelated shelter investors).
A problem with the "present value" standard is how courts, without special training, determine present
value of either the economic gain or the benefit of tax reduction. A more realistic standard is that the
economic gain or loss be substantial in relation to the tax benefits. See Lyon. supra note 80. This is the sort
of standard a court can be expected to determine.
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have required the assumption of the risk of some economic loss.9" For example,
a leading partnership special allocation case required a "gain chargeback.""
Taking the first of the two partnership examples given above, in order for the
special allocation of partnership losses to Doc to pass muster, the partnership
agreement would have to charge this allocation against Doc's capital account,
both as a way of preserving a record of the allocation over into other tax years,
and as a way of requiring that the special allocation itself have some potential
economic consequences.96 The parties can apparently share gains equally, if
there are any to share, without taking into account the special allocation to
Doc. However, if there are losses, these must be assumed by Doc in greater
proportion because of the previous special allocation of tax reductions to him.
The Treasury seems to require in sale-leasebacks that the risk be substantial97
and that the risk consist of both potential for economic gain and for economic
loss. Either alone is not sufficient. 98
The cases seem to indicate that the increase in economic risk must come
from the allocation, not simply from the transaction. In the leading Oil case,
modeled above with Doc and Oil, Doc stands to lose his entire investment if
the hole is dry.99 Nevertheless, he must assume a greater risk of loss because of
the special allocation. Otherwise, the special allocation will be disallowed
(although he can share on a pro-rata basis in the general transactional losses
when and if they occur.)'01
Even after meeting the threshold requirement,'' the fact pattern must still
"Even the Supreme Court in Lyon ("parties' choice" sale-leaseback allowed) discussed the risk to the buyer
("Lyon [the buyer/lessor], an ongoing enterprise, exposed its very business well-being to... real and substantial risk.") 435 U.S. at 577. The Court also indicated that Lyon assumed a tax gamble as well as an economic
one. Id.at 580, n. 15. Frank Lyon Co. would have received tax benefits worth between $300,000 and $1.5
million for its $500,000 investment. See also Smith, 331 F.2d 298 where the sale of tax reduction was allowed, the court emphasizing the selling taxpayer did not know then if his taxes would be greater. In Lyon,
Judge Stephens' dissent points out that the risk was in fact minimal. Frank Lyon Co. only assumed two risks:
(I) that the lessee/bank might become insolvent; and (2) that the lessee/bank might not exercise its option in
25 years. However, it should be noted that while the likelihood of these two events occurring might be small,
the consequences if they did were not. Frank Lyon Co. would have to shoulder the entire burden of the
building until it could find a new tenant. (In fact, the bank has become insolvent, 1985).
"5Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395. A chargeback reduces the liquidation payout to a partner on account of the special
allocation. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1984) takes the view that the potential for a lower payout is sufficient
to meet this test. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) published March 9, 1983 contained an internal conflict, the
basic rule was that the allocation must have some economic effect. Under Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.704-l(b)(2)(ii), example I (vii), modeled closely on Orrisch, it appears clear that the special allocation would
meet the threshold and have economic effect even though it would only reduce the payout if there were a
loss. See also Ogden v. Comm'r, 84 T.C. 871 (1985) (no gain chargeback, no special allocation).
'"This is also the capital analysis of Orrisch with the requirement of gain chargeback which assures that the
present value of the tax benefits will be roughly half of their costs. Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395.
97
Rev. Proc. 75-21 1975-1 C.B. 715. See also Rev. Proc. 75-28, 1975-1 C.B. 752 (procedure for obtaining a
letter ruling under Rev. Proc. 75-21); and Rev. Proc. 76-30, 1976-2 C.B. 647.
"See supra note 99.
"Allison, 701 F.2d 933 (partnership special allocation disallowed because no gain chargeback.)
'"Miller v. Comm'r, 53 T.C.M. (P-H) 84,336 (1984) (allocation lacked economic substance, but taxpayer
allowed depreciation deduction on his ownership percentage).
"'This raises a question. If the parties fail this test of a non-tax economic effect (or any of the other

19861

SALES OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX REDUCTIONS

be classified. In the sale-leaseback cases the available categories are crude:
ownership by the lessor or ownership by the lessee, each with quite different
tax consequences. As in the first set of transactions, in many cases the transaction's "substance" is simply not easily determinable for purposes of classifying
a complex transaction. There is a trend away from "parties' choice" toward a
visceral judicial antipathy to transactions which fragment and market tax
reductions. While the evidence is not yet clear, at least in this second pair of
decisions, courts do seem to be resisting marketed sales of tax reductions by
construing the transaction against the sale.
Just as in the first pair of transactions, the courts' approach in saleleasebacks and special allocations is rational. All four transactions spring from
unclear classifications which spin confused bodies of precedents. "Parties'
choice" as a method of classification creates special hazards in the second pair.
However, all of the problems of the first pair are also present. Construing
against the sale thus allows the same benefits found in the first pair. In addition, this approach marginally preserves the virtues of the perceived tax system
by actually inhibiting tax reduction sales.
Applying this approach to the sale-leaseback cases, construing against tax
reduction sales would require all of the extra value be allocated to the lease (the
generally least favorable tax position). The usual tax controversy would then
be between the lessor and the Treasury. Courts could require the lessor to
show all of the following to overcome the presumption: (1) that there was a
lease; (2)that the lease had some substance; (3)that an amount was specifically
allocated to the lease payments; (4) that this amount, as compared with leases
of comparable property, is reasonable; (5) that any note be similar to other
arms-length arrangements; (6) that the note payments as compared to comparable payments of interest and principal be reasonable; (7)that the contract
between the parties describe the tax consequences of the lease and note; and (8)
that the lessor agree to report the income as taxable income. In addition, the
lessor and lessee should both be required to report the other's income tax identifying number.
The use of this criteria against partnership special allocations is less clear
because the medium is much more fluid and the internal transactions are much
less open to comparison and control than sale-leasebacks. The facts of each
case should make it clear, at least in promoted tax shelter cases, which way the
tax reductions were being marketed and at which point the sales could be
regulatory rules for successful sales), how is the fact pattern classified? This is not a significant problem in

the partnership special allocation cases where adefault classification is provided but is a potential problem in
cases such as Lyon. The answer would appear in this case to be that the possible substantial economic effect
for the allocation is so slight as to fail the threshold test. Then, the alternate classification will have a sufficiently strong economic effect to provide a clear alternative. In Lyon, the bank was the clear alternative
owner of the building if Lyon failed the test. In addition, the test of interpreting against the sale of tax reductions handles this problem in most cases.
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disallowed construing against tax reduction sales. Partnership special allocations would throw the burden on the limited partners or the partnership acting
in their behalf. Two options are possible. The strong position would allocate all
to the general partner unless the limited partners were able to make certain
showings. The weak position would allocate reductions pro-rata based on the
partnership's allocation of income and capital accounts, picking the least
favorable of the two in case of ambiguity. The usual tax controversy would
then be between the limited partners (or the partnership acting on their behalf)
and the Treasury. Courts could require the limited partners to show all of the
following to overcome the presumption: (1)that there was a partnership special
allocation of depreciation or other reduction; (2) that the allocation had some
economic substance, perhaps requiring capital account gain chargeback, and
some risk as an economic threshold; (3)that the allocation was reasonable by
comparing the rights and duties of the partner with those of nonpartnership
allocations; (4) that the contract between the parties describe the tax consequences of the partnership special allocation; and (5) that the limited partner
agree to reduce his or her capital account by the amount of the reduction.
Finally, the parties should be required to report the partners' income tax identifying numbers.
CONCLUSION

As must be evident from recent events, the surface of tax law is in constant turmoil. I am more interested in features which lie below the surface. The
cases from which the research base of this article is drawn are mainly pre-1985
cases and the article was written before the new IRC section 704(b) regulations
were promulgated.' Nevertheless, its central discoveries remain perfectly
valid. The fundamental way tribunals classify fact patterns, the "substance"
method, does not always work, and expedient resort to the alternative "parties'
choice" method creates its own unique problems. In most cases, the best solution is congressional legislation, tightening the categories along the lines of the
post-1984 divorce provisions, or equalizing the tax treatment of indistinguishable fact patterns in order to reduce the flexibility of taxpayers in
choosing favorable categories. For example, in business sales, Congress could
make the tax results attributable to goodwill and covenants not to compete
identical for the two parties. 03
When a court must decide a case where the transaction's "substance" is
not effective, it should resist resorting to "parties' choice." Especially in
anyone-can-play transactions and marketed tax shelters, the principal harm is
to the taxpayers' perceptions of the system's fairness. Courts should try to interpret against the flow of tax reduction sales.
'"2Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (TD 8065, filed Dec. 24, 1985).
'"'This is the solution used to make the consequences of professional corporations' qualified plans the same
as those of unincorporated Keogh plans.

